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Abstract 
 
The Gezi protests in Turkey, May 2013, involved the European diaspora as well as the 
Turkish population in Turkey. Ethnic minorities whose roots were in Turkey may have felt 
torn between their country of residence and the nation where they or members of their family 
were born as they passively or actively participated in those events.  We ask if that 
participation had measurable impact on the attitudes and behaviors of the Turkish diaspora 
towards their country of residence and their nation of origin. We also investigate the use of 
social media to communicate about the demonstrations; the relationship between the diaspora 
and friends and family in Turkey; the attitudes towards Turkey as well as their country of 
residence, and their thoughts about the possible accession of Turkey to Europe. Responses of  
Turkish diaspora groups with both positive and negative attitudes towards the Gezi movement 
were included in a survey of 967 respondents in Belgium, The Netherlands and Germany 
between November 2013 and May 2014.  The Gezi movement led to increased engagement 
with Turkey alongside more positive attitudes toward Turkey.  However, few of the 
respondents were actually prompted to participate in demonstrations and offline forums in 
their countries of residence.  
 
Keywords: Social media, Turkish diaspora, Gezi movement, attitude change, behavioral 
change, political participation.  
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A Crisis Moment: The Gezi Protest Movement 
The Gezi protest movement represented a significant moment in Turkish political history. On 
May 28, 2013, about 50 activists crowded in Taksim Square to challenge the urban 
development scheme aimed at the destroying Gezi Park in Istanbul's Beyoğlu region to make 
space for the construction of a shopping mall. What had begun as a minor environmental 
protest, grew rapidly into a countrywide remonstration against then Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan. Protests grew in response to the confrontational approach of the Erdogan 
government on a range of issues, including censorship of the national media and the excessive 
use of tear gas, water cannons, and plastic bullets by the police (Yuksek, 2013). Out of a 
population of eighty million, an estimated three and a half million actively participated in 
almost 5,000 protests countrywide. Eleven people were killed, and more than 8,000 were 
injured (de Bellaigue, 2013) before the movement wound down in late June.  
The demonstrations in Turkey were both supported and opposed by members of  the 
Turkish diaspora in Europe. Numerous "offline" actions including street demonstrations 
occurred around the world in support of the Gezi Park protesters (Baser, 2015). The 
involvement of the Turkish diaspora was evident especially in Germany, Belgium, and The 
Netherlands; the nations with the highest number of Turkish minorities respectively, where 
residents also participated in forums and on social media to support or oppose the protests.  
 Many scholars have studied other social movements to determine the role of online 
and offline activity, especially by the young people who have made up the greatest percentage 
of the protestors  (Auragh and Alexander, 2011; Boulianne, S., 2015; Bruns, Highfield and 
Burgess, 2013; Earl and Kimport, 2011; Harlow and Guo, 2014; Mercea, 2012).  Xenos, 
Vroman and Loader (2014) tested the relationship between social media use and political 
participation among those aged 16-29 in three countries, concluding that social media use is 
significantly related to individual and collective political engagement, among other findings.  
 
Research Aims and Questions 
The integration of the Turkish minorities in their host countries was affected negatively by the 
protests as individuals on both sides of the conflict went so far as to end relationships with 
friends taking an opposing view, and began building new networks with those of like mind.  
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The mixed reactions toward Gezi gave us an extraordinary opportunity to study this attitude 
and behavioral change with respect to the diaspora’s orientation towards Turkey and the 
European countries of residence.  
We explore reported changes in social media usage and other forms of participation; 
and changes in attitudes among the Turkish diaspora towards Turkey, their country of 
residence,  and the accession of Turkey to Europe.  
More specifically, we pose the following research questions: 
RQ1 What is the profile of the Turkish diaspora in Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Germany who participated in the Gezi movement? 
RQ2 What attitude or behavioral change took place among the diaspora population 
during the time of their participation in the Gezi protests?   
 
Data and Methods  
An online and offline survey of individuals with a Turkish or Kurdish background was 
conducted between November 2013 and May 2014. This extended period was required to 
overcome the difficulties in the recruitment process based on respondent fears of 
repercussions by the Turkish government or misunderstandings related to the goals of the 
research.  
Turkish or Kurdish minorities who were first, second or third generation immigrants 
made up the participants in the study. Snowball sampling was used to evenly draw out a 
sample of 967 participants representing the Turkish diaspora in the three target countries 
(34.3% in Belgium; 32.6% in the Netherlands; and 33.1% in Germany). The online and 
offline respondents were recruited through ethnic organizations on social media platforms 
across the three countries, and at organizations, social gatherings, protest and other events 
around the urban areas. The questionnaire was offered in offline and online formats in 
English, Dutch, German and Turkish.  Online questionnaires used the Qualtrics interface. The 
online survey responses made up 89% (N=860) of the total while the remaining 11% (N=107) 
of questionnaires were completed on paper offline.  
Included in the study were a range of demographic variables in addition to fifteen 
variables that measured attitudes towards Turkey, digital activism, social activism, 
connections with Turkey and other members of the Turkish diaspora, attitudes towards the 
accession of Turkey to the EU, and thoughts about the European political stance towards 
Turkey under the effect of Gezi. 
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Results   
Respondents’ demographics  
Our respondents are perhaps understandably younger and better educated than most of the 
Turkish/Kurdish diaspora in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany.  Because there are few 
significant differences among the respondents in the three countries,  we will report on them 
as a group here. With a mean age of  31 and a range of 17-75, most are unmarried (61.9%) 
and many are students (44.4%).  The group is about evenly split between males (46.8%) and 
females (53.2%) who live in Belgium (34.3%), the Netherlands (32.6%) or Germany (33.1%). 
Though the majority have some college education or received an undergraduate degree 
(35.6%), an additional 38.3% have post-graduate education or have received a graduate 
degree.  The rest (24.1%) have high school or vocational school diplomas or did not complete 
their educations to that level. In terms of their age and educational levels they are not typical 
of the Turkish and Kurdish ethnic minorities in the three countries.  About half of the 
respondents were born in Turkey (51.6%) and the rest were born in Europe.  Nearly all of the 
respondents are Turkish citizens (82.2%), while 46.1% of those who responded to a question 
citizenship in another country are citizens of one of the countries where data was collected. A 
large percentage of respondents left blank the name of the country other than Turkey in which 
they hold citizenship.  Far fewer (only 8%) of respondents said they were dual nationals of 
Germany and Turkey than did those who said they hold citizenship in Belgium and Turkey 
(40.8%) or the Netherlands and Turkey (45.0%). Overall, respondents have lived in Europe 
about 20 years, ranging from less than a year to 64 years. Turkish or Kurdish are the 
languages respondents speak with their families (65.8%), but 30.7% say they speak both the 
language of the country where they live alongside Turkish or Kurdish at home. Only 3.5% 
speak only the European language where they live.  
The majority of the respondents who answered the question say they have a faith 
(57.9) which is likely Muslim given that more than 95% of the population in Turkey declares 
its religion as Islam.  A majority also feel that the country where they live is their homeland 
(30.3%) or that it is their second homeland (41.0%) and feel a part of that country.  At the 
same time, they were not very satisfied with the support for Turkish minorities provided to 
them in the country where they lived (28.7% were satisfied or very satisfied).  
But they also had strong feelings about Gezi and their attachment to Turkey, as 49.3% said 
they actively or passively (17.3%) supported the movement, while 30.5% opposed it.  The 
respondents’ positions on Gezi did not translate into support for Turkey’s accession to the 
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European Union; only 32.7% supported Turkey’s inclusion.  Following on their weak support 
for accession, a majority of respondents across the three countries believed that it would not 
happen at all and that the EU never planned to admit Turkey (26.2% for Belgium, 23.9% for 
Netherlands and 25.4% for Germany). Many believed that accession would not benefit 
Turkey (32.9% for Belgium, 45% for Netherlands and 40.2% for Germany), while the 
percentage of respondents believing that benefits would accrue was 34.8% for Belgium, 22% 
for Netherlands, and 26.8% for Germany.  
 
Media use 
The nature of media use among the respondents of the three countries is presented in Table 1, 
but we highlight a few of those uses here. Respondents use a range of traditional and online 
media from Turkey and European sources.  Though 33.5% of them say they prefer Turkish 
news channels, 51.8%  say they have no preference between Turkish and European news 
sources. Given their high levels of internet and social media use, and the attention focused on 
Gezi during the period in question, it is not very surprising that respondents followed Gezi 
news on Facebook most often, and on television second.  Facebook was also the most cited 
source of their first news of the demonstrations in (41.1%) with television cited second 
(26.1%). 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Attitudes and Behavioral Changes based on Gezi 
To measure changes in attitudes or behavior based on Gezi, the Binomial test procedure, 
which compares the observed frequencies of the two categories of a dichotomous variable to 
the frequencies expected under a binomial distribution with a specified probability parameter, 
was used. The frequencies of agree and disagree responses for each question were examined 
to determine the amount of difference between observed and expected responses with a 
probability of 0.33  as there were three options for each question (positive, neutral and 
negative responses). Hence, for the binomial test for both agree/disagree responses, a cutoff 
value of 0.33 was established so that 33%  of the responses were agree/disagree responses. 
The 1-tailed p-value is the probability of getting the observed proportion of responses or a 
more extreme result. A value significantly higher or lower than 0.33 for responses is shown as 
significant according to the p-value. Figures 1 show that almost 93% of respondents agree that 
they were more interested in Turkey after Gezi protests compared to only 2.7% of respondents 
6 
 
disagreeing with the statement. There were 49.1%  agree responses to encourage people to 
participate in activities related to Turkey through social media, higher than the expected 33% 
as well as 36% disagree responses to this question. Positive and negative attitude and 
behavioral change are illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Interest in Turkey after Gezi (2.72%), increased usage of Facebook (23.52%) and increased 
face-to-face interactions with those living in Turkey (28.94%) demonstrate that the observed 
percentage of negative responses was lower than the expected percentage (33%). An 
overwhelming percentage of agreement was expressed for interest in Turkey after Gezi 
(93%), increased usage of Facebook activities (63.69%), encouraging people to participate in 
activities through social media (49.1%), increased Twitter usage (44.5%) and increased 
connections with Turkey (42%). This shows how Gezi positively affected the respondents in 
terms of  increased presence and activism on social media alongside  increased connections to 
Turkey and other members of the  Turkish diaspora. Alternatively, the percentages of negative 
responses higher than expected were expressed related to inviting people to participate 
through telephone (49.6%), or in offline forums (51.3%), increasing Twitter usage about Gezi 
(40.8%), becoming members of activist groups (55.5%), removing friends on Facebook based 
on their differing views on Gezi (64.7%), attending meetings related to Gezi (86.9%), 
rejecting the accession of Turkey to the EU (49.3%), and believing that Gezi caused  changed 
EU political attitudes toward Turkey (40.3%). In general, Gezi did not prompt offline 
participation and activism and or impact views related to the accession of Turkey to the EU. 
Social capital was not affected in a negative way due to Gezi either, as only a small 
percentage of people removed friends from Facebook, attended meetings concerning Gezi, or 
had a positive response to accession of Turkey to the EU.  
Next we applied a two-step cluster analysis allocating the 522 respondents (reduced 
number of respondents is due to missing values on one or more variables) to three 
homogenous clusters (Figure 2). The social-behavioral factors in our questions about the  
Gezi movement were included in the analysis of subject clustering.  Figure 3 displays the 
distribution of the 10 most important differentiating variables among the clusters. 
Distributions by country and attitudes of belonging to Turkey and anti- or pro-Gezi variables 
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were used in the clusters. The results of  the chi-square test indicating the distribution 
difference between clusters are reported in the last column (see table 2).  
 
FIGURES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
The formation of the clusters was based on the best discriminating predictor variables 
that centered on increased connections with Turkey and others in the Turkish diaspora, using 
social media to encourage people, participating in offline forums and inviting people by 
telephone to forums discussing Gezi. The cluster labeled ‘Pro-Activists’ includes respondents 
who were active on online and offline forums regarding Gezi and were affected positively by 
the Gezi events as they provided ‘agree’ responses to all the discriminating variables. The 
‘Anti-Activists’ cluster includes respondents who were largely inactive and  gave  ‘disagree’ 
responses to all the discriminating variables including increased connections with Turkey and 
participating in online and offline Gezi forums. The ‘Disengaged or neutral’ cluster includes 
respondents who were relatively  unaffected by the impact of the Gezi events and generally 
provided neutral responses to all the discriminating variables. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Looking at the cross-country distribution of the three types, we counted 191 respondents from 
Belgium, 179 respondents from the Netherlands and 152 respondents from Germany. More 
than half of the German respondents (78 out of 152) were part of the anti-activist cluster, 
whereas Belgian and Dutch respondents had almost an equal number of respondents in the 
pro-activist (Belgium=74, Netherlands=63) and anti-activist (Belgium=69, Netherlands=63) 
clusters. Interestingly, 40.9% of the pro-activists were Belgian respondents, 40.5% of the 
disengaged cluster were Dutch respondents, and 37.1% of the anti-activists were German 
respondents.  
An overwhelming majority of pro-Gezi activists said they encouraged people to take 
part in the movement through social media and invited people by telephone, increased their 
connections with Turkey and the Turkish diaspora, participated in offline forums, attended 
meetings related to Gezi, increased Facebook and Twitter usage and increased their face-to-
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face connections with others in the Turkish diaspora; alternatively a similarly large amount of 
anti-activists said they did not participate in any of those activities with.  
The pro-Gezi activists removed Facebook friends, an  indication that they did not want to 
offend their online social connections who favored the protests. The anti-activists, on the 
other hand, chose not to remove Facebook friends. The disengaged cluster provided mostly 
neutral responses towards most of the above-mentioned questions, but did increase their social 
media use, and encouraged participation  by others in those online spaces.  The disengaged 
cluster were more active on social platforms but otherwise adopted a neutral position towards 
further forms of activism. The group could be considered disengaged offline, but pro-Gezi 
activists online.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion  
Gezi had a positive effect on modifying the behavior of the respondents by influencing them 
to be active through social media and to be generally concerned about the events taking place 
in Turkey during the Gezi protests. However, the Gezi events did not impact the respondents 
of the Turkish diaspora in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany such that they would 
participate in offline activities in general. Only a small percentage of people were affected 
enough to take to the streets or participate in other offline activities or to take somewhat 
extreme measures online by deleting friends from Facebook or to join activism forums.  
Respondent attitudes towards Turkey were more positive and more people expressed 
increased awareness of the events taking place in the country. The diaspora respondents did 
not grow closer to others in the diaspora, but did increase their closeness to those in Turkey.  
They were generally pessimistic about the demonstrations’ impact on EU membership for 
Turkey.  In an analysis of an open-ended question about that impact, 27.9% said it would be 
negative, while another 18.6% said there would be no effect at all.   
Since we have not replicated this study, we have no way of knowing whether the 
changed attitudes or behaviors have persisted since Gezi.  Data were collected beginning 
several months following the actual demonstrations and the cutoff date for collection didn’t 
occur until nearly a year after the street demonstrations, so the respondents had time to reflect 
on their attitudes and behaviors over a period of time.  We believe that the political 
engagement on the part of the respondents in this study might well have continued, given Holt 
et al.’s finding in a four-wave study of  young people’s  media use in Sweden for political 
purposes that social media have a positive effect on both overall political interest and offline 
political participation (2013, p. 32). Lim (2013) argued that social media activism can only be 
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successful when there is little risk to the participants and the activists’ ideologies don’t  
challenge the meta-narratives in society or are contested by the powerful narratives endorsed 
by mainstream media (p. 653). Since the Gezi protests, the mainstream media in Turkey (and 
therefore, their counterparts in Europe) have only been free to publish one narrative—the one 
that supports and even champions the authoritarian government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and 
his Justice and Development Party. In 2015 alone, 15 journalists were jailed (bringing the 
total to 67) including the editor and a senior staff member of Cumhuriyet (for espionage and 
aiding a terrorist organization) (Today’s Zaman, January 2016; Committee to Protect 
Journalists, December, 2015). At least 700 others have been sued for insulting President 
Erdoğan (Today’s Zaman, 2015).  Respondents in our study, who travel to Turkey an average 
of twice a year, expressed fear of reprisals despite their residence in one of the three countries 
in focus. 
It is difficult to see how social media activism can be successful either in Turkey or in 
the diaspora as long as the government threatens  political expression in opposition to its own 
views. At the time of Gezi, people had less fear of openly expressing their views, but since 
that time closures of  Twitter and YouTube and arrests of those who dare to publicly disagree 
with government policies have nearly curtailed dissent.  
 
 
 
Table 1: Media use 
  
Frequency  Percent 
Internet Use Frequency 
(all/most of time)    
619 64.0% 
   
Have a Twitter account 477 49.3% 
   
Where they first heard   
 About Gezi  (Facebook) 
 
397 
 
41.1% 
(Twitter) 91 9.4% 
(TV)                   252 26.1% 
   
Turkish Newspaper Reading 
    Frequency (Online/Offline)    
  (Every Day/Nearly Every Day) 
 
519 53.7% 
   
European Newspaper Reading  
Frequency (Online/Offline) 
(Every Day/Nearly Every Day) 
 
467 48.3% 
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Turkish Television Viewing(Several hours/day) 440 45.5% 
   
European Television Viewing(Several hours/day) 401 41.4% 
   
News Channel of Choice 
(Selected Turkish) 
 
 
324 33.5% 
   
Use of Social Media 
    (Most of time) 
 
 
377 39.0% 
   
Use of Traditional Media 
    (Most of time) 
 
 
362 37.4% 
   
Where they follow news of Gezi 
    (All of the time/most of the time) 
 
  
Facebook 768 79.4% 
Twitter 395 40.8% 
 Newspapers 431 44.6% 
  TV 584 60.4% 
   
Increase During Gezi of Online Media Use 
 
  
Facebook 593 61.3% 
Twitter 399 41.3% 
Online Forums 238 24.6% 
 
 
 
Table 2: Distribution of the 10 most important variables among the three clusters 
 
 
Variables 
 Clusters   
P Pro-
activists 
181 
(34.1%) 
Neutral 
131 (25.1%) 
Anti-
activist 
210 
(40.2%) 
ENCOURAGED PEOPLE THROUGH SOCIAL 
MEDIA 
   <0.001 
Disagree 3(1.7) 13(9.9) 175(83.3)  
Neither 2(1.1) 54(41.2) 8(3.8)  
Agree 176(97.2) 64(48.9) 27(12.9)  
INVITED PEOPLE IN PERSON OR BY 
TELEPHONE 
   <0.001 
Disagree 17(9.4) 42(32.1) 205(97.6)  
Neither 30(16.6) 64(48.9) 1(0.5)  
Agree 134(74.0) 25(19.1) 4(1.9)  
INCREASED CONNECTIONS WITH    <0.001 
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TURKISH DIASPORA 
Disagree 17(9.4) 17(13.0) 149(71.0)  
Neither 15(8.3) 89(67.9) 30(14.3)  
Agree 149(82.3) 25(19.1) 31(14.8)  
INCREASED CONNECTION WITH TURKEY    <0.001 
Disagree 12(6.6) 28(21.4) 146(69.5)  
Neither 17(9.4) 75(57.3) 25(11.9)  
Agree 152(84.0) 28(21.4) 39(18.6)  
PARTICIPATED OFFLINE FORUM    <0.001 
Disagree 38(21.0) 38(29.0) 197(93.8)  
Neither 33(18.2) 63(48.1) 11(5.2)  
Agree 110(60.8) 30(22.9) 2(1.0)  
REMOVED FRIENDS    <0.001 
Disagree 88(48.6) 47(35.9) 204(97.1)  
Neither 23(12.7) 50(38.2) 4(1.9)  
Agree 70(38.7) 34(26.0) 2(1.0)  
FACEBOOK  ACTIVITIES    <0.001 
Disagree 4(2.2) 15(11.5) 111(52.9)  
Neither 4(2.2) 30(22.9) 24(11.4)  
Agree 173(95.6) 86(65.6) 75(35.7)  
MEMBERSHIP IN ASSOCIATIONS    <0.001 
Disagree 49(27.1) 53(40.5) 182(86.7)  
Neither 36(19.9) 48(36.6) 18(8.6)  
Agree 96(53.0) 30(229) 10(4.8)  
TWITTER ACTIVITIES    <0.001 
Disagree 4(2.2) 15(11.5) 111(52.9)  
Neither 4(2.2) 30(22.9) 24(11.4)  
Agree 173(95.6) 86(65.6) 75(35.7)  
INCREASED FACE TO FACE  
INTERACTIONS WITH TURKISH 
DIASPORA 
   <0.001 
Disagree 42(23.2) 27(20.6) 112(53.3)  
Neither 46(25.4) 81(61.8) 38(18.1)  
Agree 93(51.4) 23(17.6) 60(28.6)  
COUNTRY    0.016 
Belgium 74(40.9) 48(36.6) 69(32.9)  
Netherland 63(34.8) 53(40.5) 63(30.0)  
Germany 44(24.3) 30(22.9) 78(37.1)  
SENSE OF BELONGING TO HOSTLAND    0.22 
No, I have never felt a sense of belonging 32(18.1) 18(13.8) 42(20.3)  
Uncertain 19(10.7) 11(8.5) 23(11.1)  
Yes, it is my second homeland and I feel as a 
part of it 
67(37.9) 52(40.0) 91(44.0)  
Yes, I consider myself as a part of the 
country I am living in now 
59(33.3) 49(37.7) 51(24.6)  
ANTI/PROGEZI    0.97 
Anti Gezi 51(28.3) 37(28.7) 56(27.6)  
Pro Gezi 129(71.7) 92(71.3) 147(72.4)  
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Figure 1 : Positive and negative attitudes and behavioural changes based on Gezi (in %) 
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Figure 2: Size of Clusters 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of the 10 most important variables among the three clusters 
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